In this entry we carry out an experiment in inspecting distinction.

In this entry we return to the view of life as naming. Having indicated some tools in the exploration of other views in this series, we can now employ them in characterizing naming by showing the relation of naming to these other views.

We consider choice and the distinction between the internal and external world from the views of distinction as naming and as contradiction.

With our heavy reliance on truth, how can we keep as meaningful our statements, yet see truth as merely a phenomenon? We've described assertions with naming, or taking together. Here we look at "not".

We will look here at another view of distinction, one that doesn't grapple with contradiction, by removing the primacy of truth and falsity. The fundamental element of this view is naming.

How do we make sense of the paradoxes of philosophical logic in the larger picture of philosophy as a whole? We explore here how distinction is related to the reason of philosophical logic and where contradiction relates the two.